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UNBOUNDED EXPECTATIONS AND THE SHOOTING ROOM
RANDALL G. MCCUTCHEON
Abstract. Several treatments of the Shooting Room Paradox have failed to rec-
ognize the crucial role played by its involving a number of players unbounded in
expectation. We indicate Reflection violations and other vulnerabilities in extant
proposals, then show that the paradox does not arise when the expected number
of participants is finite; the Shooting Room thus takes its place in the growing list
of puzzles that have been shown to require infinite expectation. Recognizing this
fact, we conclude that prospects for a “straight solution” are dim.
1. Introduction
Several well-known puzzles and paradoxes philosophers have been discussing in the
previous couple decades, including the the St. Peterburg Paradox (see e.g. Martin
2001), the Two Envelopes Problem (see e.g. Chalmers 1994), the so-called Pasadena
Game (Nover and Ha´jek 2004), etc., crucially involve quantities unbounded in expec-
tation. The Shooting Room (Leslie 1996) is a puzzle that clearly involves a quantity
unbounded in expectation. Heretofore, however, published treatments have failed to
even recognize this–much less indicate in a clear way that the involvement is crucial.
William Eckhardt (1997) reworks the puzzle to his comfort zone:
Successive groups of individuals are brought into a room and
given the same highly favorable wager, say, betting $100.00
that the “house,” with fair dice, rolls anything but double
sixes. (In the original formulation, losing players are shot,
but this added gruesomeness, if nothing else, complicates
the question of how one should bet.) Whenever the room
occupants win their bets, ten times as many people are re-
cruited for the next round. Once the house wins, the game
series is over. So the house can truthfully announce before
any games are played that, in spite of the highly favorable
odds, at least 90% of all players will lose. The puzzle is that
these bets appear to be both favorable and unfavorable: fa-
vorable because double sixes are rare, unfavorable because
the overwhelming majority of players lose.
We will make a few cosmetic changes/addenda to the above scenario. First, one
person bets in the first round, nine in the second round, ninety in the third, then nine
hundred, nine thousand, etc. Next, the players are stipulated to have epistemically
similar backgrounds and bet in isolation from each other; they can’t tell how many
others are betting in that round. Finally, the results of the bets are only announced at
an open debriefing attended by all the players from all the rounds of betting. Players
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may count the number of attendees, but they sleep between playing and debriefing,
and do not know how much time has passed in the interim.
Eckhardt argues for a credence of 1
36
in I lose prior to the roll one is betting on, but
is also comfortable, so far as we can tell, in a credence ≈ 9
10
in I lose once the bets
are concluded:
...it is an error to consider yourself a random or typical
player until you lose your bet. Before then, you have only
about a 3% chance of belonging to the 90% majority. (...)
This means you should not consider yourself random until
the game series is over. (...) if a player about to bet were
truly random among all players, then he would have better
than a 90% chance of losing....
What troubles us is the emphasized (in the original) clause, which appears to sanction
a belief, by the player, that she has lost with 90% probability once “the game series
is over” (at the debriefing, in our version). No “solution” endorsing this can claim
to have dissolved the paradox; a player having credence 1
36
in I lose at the time the
bet is placed, knowing that with probability 1 the game will end (to deny this leads
to trouble too; see below) and she will have credence of at least 9
10
at the debriefing,
appears to violate Reflection. (And this does not appear to be one of the well-known
“benign” sorts of violations of “naive” Reflection; cf. Schervish et. al. 2004).
In an inspired moment, Paul Bartha and Christopher Hitchcock (1999) offer a way
out of the seeming paradox. Assigning “draft positions” to the potential participants
that determine the order in which they will be called to the room, they show that
if an individual has any countably additive probability distribution over her possible
draft position, her expected credence in I lose at the debriefing will be precisely 1
36
.
To see this let pn be the probability of a “draft round” equal to n + 1 (e.g. if your
“draft position” is in {11, 12, . . . , 100}, your “draft round” is 3) and note that:
(1) Prior probability in I play is
∑∞
n=0(
35
36
)npn.
(2) Posterior in I lose conditional on 10x present at debriefing is px
p0+p1+···+px .
(3) Probability of 10x present conditional on I play is
Pr(10x)Pr(play |10x)
Pr(play)
=
(35
36
)x( 1
36
)(p0 + p1 + · · ·+ px)∑∞
n=0(
35
36
)npn
, hence
(4) Expectation of posterior in I lose at debriefing conditional on I play is
∞∑
x=0
(35
36
)x( 1
36
)(p0 + p1 + · · ·+ px)∑∞
n=0(
35
36
)npn
( px
p0 + p1 + · · ·+ px
)
=
1
36
.
This solves the Reflection problem but introduces a new one in its place. Bartha
and Hitchcock put it this way: “...the weakness of this analysis is its inability to
accomodate the intuition that (the participant) is equally likely to have any draft
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position.”1 They then offer another analysis in which participants have a merely
finitely additive distribution over draft positions assigning equal infinitesimal weight
to each natural number n.
Without going into the specifics of how, Bartha and Hitchcock conclude that, al-
though conditional on the participant being selected to enter the room and the ex-
periment having ended with a losing round, the probability that she lost is indeed
9
10
, it is however the case that conditional just on the participant being selected, the
probability that she lost is 1
36
. Their explanation, roughly, as for why this is so is
that, conditional on the participant being selected to enter the room, the probability
that the experiment ends isn’t equal to 1, but rather2 5
162
!
Pr(Lose|Selected)
=Pr(End|Selected)Pr(Lose|End & Selected)
+ Pr(No End|Selected)Pr(Lose|No End & Selected)
=
(
5
162
)(
9
10
)
+
(
157
162
)(
0
1
)
=
1
36
.(1.1)
But this merely pushes the paradox back a round. Indeed, Bartha and Hitchcock
look to be committed to a probability of the participant being in a final winning
round, conditional on the participant being selected to enter the room, of 1
360
; she is
one-tenth as likely to be in a final winning round as in a losing round. That is:
Pr(Final Winning|Selected)
=Pr(End|Selected)Pr(Final Winning|End & Selected)
+ Pr(No End|Selected)Pr(Final Winning|No End & Selected)
=
(
5
162
)(
9
100
)
+
(
157
162
)(
0
1
)
=
1
360
.(1.2)
More generally, they should say that conditional on her entering the room, the proba-
bility that there are exactly n winning rounds after hers is ( 1
10
)n+1 1
36
. Indeed, observe
that
∑∞
n=−1(
1
10
)n+1 1
36
= 5
162
; apparently this is what Bartha and Hitchcock would as-
sent to. Yet this is just as puzzling as the original paradox. To bring this into relief,
stipulate that you only win if the rolls in your own round and the next land other
than double six. (That is, it requires now two safe rolls to win.) Nothing else changes.
Now it seems (by the Principal Principle, which Bartha and Hitchcock appear to de-
fer to in their endnote 3) that you should assign probability 1
36
+ 35
36
· 1
36
= 71
1296
to
1Since we are assuming that the players have identical epistemic backgrounds, presumably they
will each employ the same distribution over draft position. The result is that they won’t in gen-
eral believe, at a debriefing attended by 10n players, that their own draft position is, say, 1 with
probability 10−n. In other words, each player will believe themselves to be “special”.
2We don’t agree that the probability should be 5162 , but it’s more straightforward to grant this
and demonstrate that it doesn’t resolve the paradox anyway than it would be to recapitulate their
sixteen page nonstandard analysis argument and say where we think it overreaches.
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losing. On the other hand, it seems you should assign probability at least 99
100
to losing
(since at least that fraction of all participants lose). But no...according to Bartha
and Hitchcock, the probability that you lose is actually only 1
36
+ 1
360
= 11
360
! (Which,
bizarrely, is now less than it would be if there weren’t so many losing participants.)
We don’t guess that anyone will be able to live with this. So until Bartha and
Hitchcock offer an explanation for why one should preserve the accord with the
Principal Principle for the first roll of the dice, but break it for subsequent rolls,
one must conclude that the 5
162
gimmick fails to accomplish anything at all.
2. Infinite repeated Shooting Room
At the beginning of the paper we promised an analysis of the Shooting Room paradox
showcasing the role of infinite expectation. To this end it is instructive to contrast
a finite expectation variant of the Shooting Room in which players lose their bets
with probability 35
36
; e.g., they win on double sixes and lose otherwise. Rounds with
identically mounting betting populations are again conducted until some group loses.
Call the venue for these bets the Brutal Room. The Brutal Room game again requires
an unbounded participant pool in order to ensure, with probability one, that one can
complete the requisite series of rounds, and we’d again like to assign draft position
priors in such a way that, at a postgame debriefing attended by N participants, each
comes to have a draft position posterior that is uniform on {1, . . . , N}.
As things are currently set up, however, this entails a uniform draft position prior
over the infinite pool of potential participants. Merely finitely additive distributions
(as we’ve just seen evidence of) are seldom, if ever, the way out of a paradox; more
typically, they give rise to them. A more useful first step is to recognize that one
can identify a countably additive draft position distribution that, when taken as our
participant’s distribution conditional on I play, yields a uniform debriefing posterior.
We identify the distribution. Denote by x the probability, conditional on I play, of
draft round D = 1. Since 9 times as many enter with draft round D = 2 (namely
positions 2-10), but round 2 takes place on only 1
36
of iterations, the probability, again
conditional on I play, of draft round D = 2 is x(9)(1/36) = 1
4
x. Similar reasoning
shows the probability, conditional on I play, of draft round D > 2 is 1
4
x( 5
18
)D−2.
Setting the sum of these probabilities equal to 1 and solving for x we get:
Pr(D = 1) = x = 26
35
,
Pr(D = 2) = 13
70
,
Pr(D = 3) = 13
252
, etc.
If now a participant shows up at the debriefing and there are (for example) 103 par-
ticipants present, her posterior draft position (not round, but position) distribution
will be uniform on {1, 2, . . . , 100}. This is because she knows one of (a)-(c) holds:
(a) D = 1 and two double sixes rolled after her arrival (probability q1 =
26·35
35·36·36·36)
3,
(b) D = 2 and one double six rolled after her arrival (probability q2 =
13·35
70·36·36 = 9q1),
3To be clear, q1 is the probability, for a participant at the debriefing who has not yet counted
those present, of the conjunction “D = 1 and exactly 3 rounds were played”.
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(c)D = 3 and zero double sixes rolled after her arrival (probability q3 =
13·35
252·36 = 10q2).
This holds generally...regardless of how many players our participant encounters at
the debriefing, she will come to have uniform draft position posterior over the cor-
responding initial segment of N. Of course one might think that there is still a
potential complication...to achieve the draft position distribution we found condi-
tional on I play would still require a uniform prior, should we continue to assume
that the game is played exactly once and that players are informed as to their status
as pool members prior to learning that they have been selected to enter the room.
There is no such complication. Simply assume that the Brutal Room game has been
played infinitely many times throughout an infinite past, and will continue to be
played throughout an infinite future. (On the view that the universe is infinite, this
strikes us as the most natural attitude.) Indeed, we may assume for convenience
here that every being is chosen to participate in exactly one iteration of the game.
(Perhaps they are selected in order of birth.) Once a given participant has commenced
the game, the first participant in that particular iteration identifies an “origin” and
the participant may revert to our talk of “draft position” and ‘draft round”. Since I
play is now a certainty, however, there is no need for the problematic uniform prior.
A Brutal Room participant suffers no Reflection violation. During her betting session,
her credence in I will be alone at the debriefing, is Pr(D = 1) times the probability
that the first roll is not double six, i.e. (26
35
)(35
36
) = 13
18
. Credence in I win at the
debriefing is 0 if they are alone and 1
10
otherwise, with expectation ( 5
18
)( 1
10
) = 1
36
.
Buoyed by this result, one might think to analyze the Shooting Room along similar
lines. We start by attempting to find a countably additive draft position distribution
that, if taken as a Shooting Room participant’s distribution conditional on I play,
yields a uniform debriefing posterior. Denote then by x, as before, the probability,
conditional on I play, of draft round D = 1. Since 9 times as many enter with draft
round D = 2 (namely positions 2-10), and round 2 takes place on 35
36
of iterations,
the probability, conditional on I play, of draft round D = 2 is x(9)(35/36) = 35
4
x.
Similarly the probability, conditional on I play, of draft round D > 2 is 35
4
x(175
18
)D−2.
But in order for these not to sum to ∞, one must have x < α for every positive
real α, so our participant is again saddled with a merely finitely additive prior. A
Reflection violation, too: the participant’s credence in I win is 1
36
during her betting
session, while her credence in I win at debriefing is 0 if she is alone and 1
10
otherwise,
with expectation (1− x) 1
10
≈ 1
10
.
More generally, if p is the (objective) probability that bettors win in a Shooting Room
style game (with round sizes fixed at 1, 9, 90, etc.) then the (subjective) probability
x of draft round D = 1, conditonal on I play, is equal to the multiplicative inverse
of the expected number of bettors in a given iteration of the game. x is therefore
infinitesimal (and the bettors’ credences conditional on I play merely finitely additive)
if and only if the expected number of players, namely 1 + 9p
∑∞
n=0(10p)
n, is infinite
(that is, precisely when p ≥ 1
10
). Since Reflection violations don’t arise when the
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participants have countably additive distributions, then, games of this sort require
infinite expectation in order to generate a paradox.4
3. Two possible resolutions
To this point we’ve been content to steer discussion to the Shooting Room’s crucial
feature, namely the slow decay rate of 10kPr(X ≥ 10k), where X is the size of the
participant pool. Given, in particular, that the paradox evaporates when E(X) is
assumed finite, the puzzle takes its place in a larger group of similar puzzles depending
crucially on infinite expectation. At this point one sees two sorts of “resolutions”.
Michael Huemer (2018) epitomizes the first. He claims that faithful implementations
of the Shooting Room are impossible, writing “The paradox depends on metaphys-
ically impossible assumptions about an infinite population of potential victims....”5
He starts by noting a tension between the following two plausible principles.
Objective Chance Principle: Given that event A hap-
pens if and only if B happens, and B has an objective chance
c of occurring, the probability that A happens is c.
Proportion Principle: Given that x is an A, and the pro-
portion of A’s that are B is p (with no reason for regarding
x as being more or less likely to be B than any of the other
A’s), the probability that x is B is p.
The Objective Chance Principle pinpoints probability of winning at 35
36
; according to
Huemer, the Proportion Principle points to a probability of 1
10
. Huemer now writes
“The two principles yield the same result...for all possible population sizes. They
disagree only in the impossible case of an infinite population.” Several arguments are
then given for this “impossibility”.
Though this strategy is promising, Huemer’s implementation fails to discern the role
of expectation. It’s not general enough to treat the population size X as a constant,
nor even uniformly bounded: for every N there is some non-zero chance that the
population size might exceed N . What the tension between the two principles turns
4The way we have set things up, a paradox can be generated (as in the Shooting Room scenario)
whenever the size of the participant pool X is taken to be distributed in such a way that the
sequence 10kPr(X ≥ 10k) grows at least exponentially; that is, when there is some β > 1 such that
10kPr(X ≥ 10k) ≥ βk for every (large enough) k. When 10kPr(X ≥ 10k) ≤ αk eventually for
some α < 1, meanwhile, paradox is averted (as in the Brutal Room scenario)–we suspect that all
nomologically possible scenarios are of this sort. There are of course intermediate cases.
5Elsewhere Huemer attempts a finitary reduction: “The impossibility...does not really lie in the
fact that the scenario assumes an infinite population. (...) Since the game has a first round, it
must have begun at some time. Whatever that time was, only a finite time has elapsed since then.”
Huemer then references a calculation in which it is shown, in effect, that if many separate game
series were started N rounds ago then an expected 3536 of their participants up to now would have
won (independently of N). A crucial feature of this calculation, however, is that these game series
may not have ended, so it doesn’t suggest any way at all to avoid the apparent Relection violation
between time of play and the end of the series. (Cf. Eckhardt 1997, who is explicit that the 90%
solution doesn’t gain traction “until the game series is over”, and Bartha and Hitchcock 1999, whose
agent subscribing to the 90% solution explicitly “hears the news that the game has ended”.)
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on is the decay rate of 10kPr(X ≥ 10k). The conclusion Huemer should aim for is
something like “The two principles yield the same result...for all possible distributions
over the size of the participant pool. They disagree only for impossible distributions.”6
David Chalmers (2002) is an instance of the second sort of resolution. Addressing the
Two Envelopes Problem, Chalmers’ strategy is to first formalize what he takes the
argument to be that there is an expected benefit to switching envelopes, then offer
a “disjunctive analysis”, attacking one set of premises when the expected amount
in the envelopes is finite and a different premise in the infinite expectation case. In
particular, he calls attention to a new scenario that, to his mind, makes it more clear
that the latter premise is defective in cases where infinite expectations arise.
Might one do something similar here? Yes, though the results don’t, to our minds,
resolve the paradox entirely.7 First one would attack the Proportion Principle by
creating a scenario in which it appears to fail. For a simple example, imagine an
infinite row of houses, each containing an ideally rational agent. A fair coin is tossed
in each and placed under a cup prior to observation. The agents are put to sleep and
the houses rearranged so that the coin lies heads in every third house. Knowing all
this, what should an agent’s credence in heads be at wakeup? One half, or one-third?
One would argue (having chosen this path) that the answer is one-half. The per-
muting is after-the-fact and arbitrary: one could just as easily have arranged that
every third house be tails, or any other pattern. Repeat the experiment many times
and one’s coin will have landed heads about half of the time with high probability,
regardless of how the houses are reshuffled in one’s sleep. So when told, at wakeup,
that exactly one of three visible houses is a heads house, one should not invoke the
Proportion Principle at all. Either the principle is false, or it doesn’t apply8; if an
agent meets with her two new next door neighbors on the lawn, knowing that these
neighbors are in the same epistemic situation she is in and that exactly one of them
has a heads coin, she should nevertheless consider herself to be “special” and continue
to assign probability one-half to her coin lying heads.9 And (one would reason), what
6We doubt infinite expectation distributions are possible, but Huemer’s arguments, which assume
constant, not random, pool size, can’t purport to establish this in their current form.
7Chalmers’ (2002) proposal for Two Envelopes (infinite expectation case) also breeds demons.
The agent there, taking Envelopes A and B to confer infinite expected utility, declines to swap A
for B though it would be in her interest to do so for every possible value in A. Fair enough, but
consider a scenario where she is offered 1 util to swap, then will learn the amount in A, then again
be given opportunity to swap (but without the 1 util enticement). She will decline the initial swap
opportunity but accept the latter, leaving her 1 util worse off than if she had accepted the first. As
always, admission of infinite expectation engenders vulnerability to a plethora of “bad books”.
8It’s perhaps impossible to craft a convincing counterexample to the principle in its current
formulation. That would require a case where the probability that x is B isn’t p, and yet where
one has no reason to regard x as being more or less likely to be B than any of the other A’s. If
one’s credences obey the probability axioms, such a case would exhibit the property that one has
no reason to regard x as having the probability claimed for it. So the claim the argument is making
is really that this (trivial) principle doesn’t apply here. (Nor, by analogy, in the Shooting Room.)
9Again, the rationality under scrutiny isn’t robust; these agents could be trivially subjected to a
group Dutch Book, for example. Indeed, once one allows infinite expectations, we concede with Vann
McGee (1999) that “rational decision making is a lost cause” (McGee’s so-called “Airtight Dutch
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goes for the coin problem goes for the Shooting Room. In the infinitely repeated
version we considered, there are, for every k ≥ 0, infinitely many groups of agents of
size 10k. Each group wins a bet with probability 1
36
and they should hold on to that
probability regardless of how they are sorted into “debriefing rooms” in their sleep.
They might be sorted into rooms where half of all agents have won, or rooms where
three or ninety-nine percent have won. Their attitudes to all such sortings should be
the same–indifference. The actual game’s protocol provides a way of sorting agents
into rooms (where ten percent have won) that should be ignored like any other.
Our purpose here isn’t to adjudicate between these rival approaches (ruling them
out vs. salvaging some impoverished version of rationality in their wake) to infinite
expectations. Each may have merit. We do insist, however, that the notion of infinite
expectation ought to figure crucially in the analysis of any puzzle in which infinite
expectation’s role is in fact crucial. Analyses that fail this test (all previous analyses
of the Shooting Room, in particular) have, we urge, missed the point–at least in part.
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Book” involves a sequence of individually favorable payoffs Xi such that
∑∞
i=1 min{Xi, 0} = −∞)
and with Jacob Ross (2010) that “there are contexts in which full rationality is impossible” (Ross
considers a Sleeping Beauty experiment with a number of awakenings having infinite expectation).
Where we differ from these authors is in our recognition of infinite expectation’s role.
